

CS169 Week 8 Section

Liang (Leon) Gong

Administrivia & Agenda

Today's Agenda:

- JavaScript
- JS Coding Practice
- JS Performance
- AJAX & Security
- Node.js

JavaScript

- **Atwood's Law:** any application that can be written in JavaScript, will eventually be written in JavaScript.
- No. 1 in the RedMonk PL Rankings
 - Popularity based on GitHub and StackOverflow



emscripten

 *CoffeeScript*



...

But...

- JavaScript is a **terribly** designed languages.
- Too many confusing features and APIs
 - You should avoid them!
- Only makes sense if you look at it from a historical perspective.

Rule: avoid using *for..in* over arrays

```
var sum = 0, value;  
var array = [11, 22, 33];  
for (value in array) {  
    sum += value;  
}  
> sum ?
```

Rule: avoid using *for..in* over arrays

```
var sum = 0, value;  
var array = [11, 22, 33];  
for (value in array) {  
    sum += value;  
}  
> sum ?
```

-  **11 + 22 + 33 => 66** array index
(not array value)
-  **0 + 1 + 2 => 3** array index : string
-  **0+"0"+"1"+"2" => "0012"**

Rule: avoid using *for..in* over arrays

```
var sum = 0, value;  
var array = [11, 22, 33];  
for (value in array) {  
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}  
> sum ?
```

- Cross-browser issues
 > "0012*indexOfToString...*"
- Result depends on the Array prototype object



array index
11 + 22 + 33 => 66 (not array value)



array index : string
0 + 1 + 2 => 3



0+"0"+"1"+"2" => "0012"

Rule: avoid using *for..in* over arrays



```
var sum = 0, value;  
var array = [11, 22, 33];  
for (value in array) {  
    sum += value;  
}  
> sum ?
```



```
for (i=0; i < array.length; i++) {  
    sum += array[i];  
}
```



```
function addup(element, index, array) {  
    sum += element;  
}  
array.forEach(addup);
```



```
for (elem of Array) { ... }
```

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Problematic JavaScript

- Designed and Implemented **in 10 days**
- Not all decisions were well-thought
- **Problematic language features**
 - Error prone
 - Poor performance
 - Prone to security vulnerabilities
- Problematic features are still around
 - Backward compatibility
- Political fights among the browser vendors





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JS

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JS

Problematic JavaScript



JS


Problematic JavaScript



JS

Pr

Exhuming the terror of JavaScript



JavaScript: The Evil Parts

cript:
Parts

Douglas Crockford

```
for (p=0;p<2;p++)  
document.write(  
eval("publisher_"+p))
```



Gregor Richards

What are coding practices?

- Good coding practices
 - Informal rules
 - Improve code quality
- Better quality means:
 - Fewer correctness issues
 - Better performance
 - Better usability
 - Better maintainability
 - Fewer security loopholes
 - Fewer surprises
 - ...

Coding Practices and Lint Tools

- Existing Lint-like checkers
 - Inspect source code
 - Rule-based checking
 - Detect common mistakes
- Limitations:
 - Approximates behavior
 - Unknown aliases
 - Lint tools favor precision over soundness
- Difficulty: Precise static program analysis



Language Misuse

Avoid setting properties of primitives,
which has no effect.

```
var fact = 42;
```

```
fact.isTheAnswer = true;
```

```
console.log(fact.isTheAnswer);
```

> *undefined*



Uncommon Values

Avoid producing ***NaN*** (Not a Number).



```
var x = 23 - "five";
```

```
> NaN
```



ALGOT
Frame/6 wire baskets/top shelf
\$64
Last year's price: \$NaN



ALGOT
Frame/wire baskets/rod
\$204
Last year's price: \$220



ALGOT
Frame/4 wire baskets/top shelf
\$44
Last year's price: \$48



ALGOT
Frame/4 wire baskets/top shelf
\$60
Last year's price: \$NaN



ALGOT
Frame/4 wire baskets
\$35
Last year's price: \$39



ALGOT
Frame/4 wire baskets
\$51
Last year's price: \$NaN



ALGOT
Frame/4 mesh baskets/top shelf
\$56
Last year's price: \$60



ALGOT
Frame with rod/wire baskets
\$74
Last year's price: \$87



ALGOT
Frame/6 wire baskets/top shelf
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Last year's price: \$NaN



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Uncommon Values

Avoid concatenating undefined to string.

```
var value;  
...  
var str = "price: ";  
...  
var result = str + value;  
  
> "price: undefined"
```



 Please Select Arrival Date

 2 Please Select Departure Date

[Next Month >>](#)

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	Starting At \$undefined	Starting At \$129	Starting At \$169
Starting At \$149	Starting At \$149	Starting At \$129	Starting At \$499			

TOURS

AMENITIES

ATTRACTIIONS

US VISITORS

SHUTTLE SERVICE

FIREWORKS & ILLUMINATION

GROUP SALES



Expedia
Insiders' Select
2014



Please Select Arrival Date

2 Please Select Departure Date

December

Next Month >>

SUNDAY

MONDAY




TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY



THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY




Starting At
\$149



Starting At
\$149




Starting At
\$129




Starting At
\$129



Starting At
\$499



Starting At
\$129



Starting At
\$169

TOURS

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**Expedia
Insiders' Select
2014**



API Misuse

Beware that all wrapped primitives coerce to true.



```
var b = false;  
if (new Boolean(b)) {  
    console.log("true");  
}  
  
> true
```

Type Related

Avoid accessing the `undefined` property.



```
var x; // undefined  
var y = {};  
y[x] = 23; // { undefined: 23 }
```

Rule: avoid setting field on primitive values

From Google Octane's Game Boy Emulator benchmark:

```
var decode64 = "";
if (dataLength > 3 && dataLength % 4 == 0) {
    while (index < dataLength) {
        decode64 += String.fromCharCode(...);
    }
    if (sixbits[3] >= 0x40) {
        decode64.length -= 1;
    }
}
```

Rule: avoid setting field on primitive values

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var decode64 = "";
if (dataLength > 3 && dataLength % 4 == 0) {
    while (index < dataLength) {
        decode64 += String.fromCharCode(...);
    }
    if (sixbits[3] >= 0x40) {
        ! decode64.length -= 1;
    }
}
```



No effect because *decode64* is a primitive string.

Rule: avoid no effect operations



- ⚠ `window.onbeforeunload=`
`"Twitch.player.getPlayer().pauseVideo();"`

- ⚠ `window.onunload=`
`"Twitch.player.getPlayer().pauseVideo();"`

Rule: avoid no effect operations



⚠️ `window.onbeforeunload=`
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⚠️ `window.onunload=`
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```
window.onbeforeunload = function () {
    Twitch.player.getPlayer().pauseVideo();
}
```

Tips: Use Contiguous Keys for Array

Use contiguous keys starting at 0 for arrays

```
var array = new Array(5000);
```

6.793s

```
var array = [];
for (var i=0; i<5000; i++) {
    array[i] = 0;
}
```

6.8s

```
for (var i=0; i<1000000000; i++) {
    array[i % 5000] = i;
}
```

```
var array = [];
array[5000-1] = 0;
```

9.163s



Tips: Use Contiguous Keys for Array

```
var array = [];
for (var i=10000; i>=0; i--) {
    array[i] = i;
}
```

Tips: Use Contiguous Keys for Array

```
var array = [];
for (var i=10000;i>=0;i--){
    array[i] = i;
}

array[10000] = 10000;
array[9999] = 9999;
...
```

- non-contiguous array
- To save memory, JIT-engine decides to represent the array with slow data structures like hash table.

Tips: Use Contiguous Keys for Array

```
var array = [];
for (var i=10000;i>=0;i--) {
    array[i] = i;
}
```

```
for (var i=0;i<=10000;i++) {
    array[i] = i;
}
```

10X+ speedup!





eval is evil, do not use *eval*.

```
var fun = eval;
```

...

⚠ fun("var a = 1;");

- Correctness Issue: `eval('a++');`
`var evil = eval; evil('a++');`
- Performance Issue: `eval` is super slow
- Security Issue: code injection attack.
`eval('a=' + userInput + ';');`



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
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

AJAX



`http://twitter.com/`




AJAX



AJAX

http://twitter.com/

http://twitter.com/




AJAX

The screenshot shows Paul Irish's Twitter profile page. At the top, there are three white circles indicating a loading state. Below that, the URL <http://twitter.com/> is displayed. The main content area shows Paul Irish's profile picture, bio, and stats: 24.8K tweets, 2,150 following, 205K followers, 4,501 likes, and 6 lists. A blue "Following" button is visible. The timeline shows a tweet from Paul Irish about site performance and another from Prashant Palikhe about a talk. On the right, a sidebar shows "Who to follow" and "Trends". A large black arrow points from the top-left towards the bottom-right of the page, highlighting the loading indicators.

<http://twitter.com/>



AJAX



```
<html>
  <head>...</head>
  <body>new content</body>
</html>
```

`http://twitter.com/`


AJAX

http://twitter.com/

http://twitter.com/



```
<html>
  <head>...</head>
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</html>
```



AJAX

http://twitter.com/

Paul Irish (@paul_irish)

What makes your site faster? ⚡ Bundling or minifying? Let's find out.
→ Practical Performance ← w/ @samccone and I

Practical Performance (Polymer Summit 2016)
A look into how to identify why a site is slow with Dev Tools, and techniques based around the PRPL pattern to make things fast again. Missed the summit? Cat... youtube.com

RETWEETS LIKES

10 44 AM - 17 Oct 2016

Reply to @paul_irish @samccone

Sean T. Larkin (@TheLarkin_ Sh...
@paul_irish @samccone YOU DONT HAVE TO present Sam just to teach me how performance measure works. But incredibly awesome work guys👏👏

Sean T. Larkin (@TheLarkin_ 2h
@paul_irish @samccone okay one thing though. Were you _really_ bundling? Or were you just concatenation those scripts.

http://twitter.com/



```
<html>
  <head>...</head>
  <body>new content</body>
</html>
```



Redundant information has to be sent again.
Refresh the entire page → bad user experience

AJAX

http://twitter.com/

Paul Irish (@paul_irish) 6h

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12 Followers you know

12 Followers you know

441 Photos and videos

441 Photos and videos

http://twitter.com/




```
["John Doe",  
 "foo@gmail.com"] ,  
 ["John Doe",  
 "bar@gmail.com"]
```

]



AJAX



http://twitter.com/

http://twitter.com/



```
[ "John Doe",  
  "foo@gmail.com" ],  
 [ "John Doe",  
  "bar@gmail.com" ]
```


]

Only send the new part (in HTML, XML, or JSON).
No need to refresh the page.




AJAX

classic web application model (synchronous)



AJAX

Ajax web application model (asynchronous)



AJAX & Same Origin Policy

ooo

http://twitter.com/

Paul Irish (@paul_irish)

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youtube.com

RETWEETS LIKES

84 295

10:44 AM - 17 Oct 2016

12 Followers you know

12 Follows

12 Followers you know

12 Follows

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http://twitter.com/



AJAX & Same Origin Policy



Origin: **http://twitter.com/**

http://twitter.com/



AJAX & Same Origin Policy



Origin: **http://twitter.com/**




http://twitter.com/



AJAX & Same Origin Policy



Origin: <http://twitter.com/>



<http://twitter.com/>



<http://google.com/>



AJAX & Same Origin Policy



Origin: **http://twitter.com/**



AJAX request




http://twitter.com/



AJAX request

http://google.com/



AJAX & Same Origin Policy

Same-Origin Policy

- Restricts communication of active content to objects that share the same origin
- Origin: protocol, port, and the host



Origin: http://twitter.com/

AJAX request




http://google.com/

AJAX request



An Attack Scenario

<http://attacker.org/>



An Attack Scenario

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://email.com/`




An Attack Scenario

`http://attacker.org/`




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


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


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


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
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
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An Attack Scenario

`http://attacker.org/`

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An Attack Scenario

Same-Origin Policy


`http://email.com/`

- Restricts communication of active content to objects that share the same origin
- Origin: protocol, port, and the host



JSON Hijacking (2006)

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://gmail.com/`



JSON Hijacking (2006)

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://gmail.com/`



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JSON Hijacking (2006)

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
`http://gmail.com/`



JSON Hijacking (2006)

`http://attacker.org/`

`http://gmail.com/`



JSON Hijacking (2006)


`http://attacker.org/`



`http://gmail.com/`

```
[ "John Doe",
  "foo@gmail.com" ] ,
[ "John Doe",
  "bar@gmail.com" ]
```

JSON Hijacking (2006)



Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://vuln.com/`



Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

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


ooo

`http://attacker.org/`

Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

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
ooo

`http://attacker.org/`




Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://vuln.com/`




ooo

`http://attacker.org/`

// 1. insert the script tag

Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://vuln.com/`



ooo

`http://attacker.org/`


// 1. insert the script tag

```
<script src="//vuln.com/dynamic.js" />
```

Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

`http://attacker.org/`


`http://vuln.com/`



Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

`http://attacker.org/`

`http://vuln.com/`



Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

`http://attacker.org/`



`http://vuln.com/`



ooo

`http://attacker.org/`

```
// 1. insert the script tag  
// 2. observe side effect
```

```
<script src="//vuln.com/dynamic.js" />
```



RQ: Can such data be leaked in a similar way?

Leaking data stored in global variables:

```
// Local variable at top level                               dynamic.js
var first_name = "John";
```

```
// variable missing the "var" keyword
last_name = "Doe";
```

```
// global variable
window.user_email = "john@doe.com";
```

```
console.log(first_name);                                evil.js
console.log(last_name);
Console.log(user_email);
```

RQ: Can such data be leaked in a similar way?

Leaking data via global functions:

```
function example() {  
    var email = "john@doe.com";  
    window.MyLibrary.doSomething(email);  
}
```

dynamic.js

```
window.MyLibrary = {};  
window.MyLibrary.doSomething = function(email) {  
    console.log(email);  
}
```

evil.js

RQ: Can such data be leaked in a similar way?

Leaking data via built-in APIs:

```
function example() {  
    var email = "john@doe.com";  
    JSON.stringify(email);  
}
```

dynamic.js

```
JSON.stringify = function (data) {  
    sendToAttackerBackend(data);  
}
```

evil.js

RQ: Can such data be leaked in a similar way?

Other APIs via built-in APIs:

Leaking data via built-in APIs

ArrayBuffer, Map, Set, WeakMap, WeakSet
*function example() {
decodeURI, "decodeURIComponent,
JSON.stringify(email);
}
escape, unescape*

...
*JSON.stringify = function (data) {
sendToAttackerBackend(data);
}* **evil.js**

Prototypical Inheritance

```
// object1 → Object.prototype → null
```

```
var object1 = {a: 1};
```

```
// object2 → object1 → Object.prototype → null
```

```
var object2 = Object.create(object1);
```

```
console.log(object2.a)
```

```
> 1
```

RQ: Can such data be leaked in a similar way?

Leaking data via the **this** reference:


```
(function () {  
    var secret_values = ["john@doe.com", "top secret"];  
    secret_values.forEach(function (secret) {  
        // do something secret here  
    })  
}());
```

```
evil.js  
  
Array.prototype.forEach = function(callback) {  
    console.log(this); // this points to the array  
}
```


RQ: Can such data be leaked in a similar way?

Other APIs: via the *this* reference:

```
String.prototype.concat           dynamic.js
(function () {
    String.prototype.substring, "top secret"];
    String.prototype.toString {
        // do something secret here
    }
    String.prototype.replace
    Array.prototype.join
    Array.prototype.map           evil.js
    Array.prototype.forEach(function(callback) {
        console.log(this); // this points to the array
    }
})
```



Motivation: Node.js is Rising



Async I/Os: Blessing and Curse

- **Node.js:** server-side JS runtime, single threaded, async programming model
- **Asynchronous API:** permits other processing to continue before the transmission has finished.
 - ✓ No time wasted on waiting blocking I/Os
 - ✓ Fast for I/O heavy tasks
 - ✗ Callback hell
 - ✗ Problematic for debugging

Event Loop and Callback

JS Stack


fs.readFile(path, () => {...})

Event Queue




Event Loop


Thread Pool




Event Loop and Callback




Event Loop and Callback




Event Loop and Callback




Event Loop and Callback




Event Loop and Callback



Event Loop and Callback



Event Loop and Callback



Trouble for Debugging

```
1 var fs = require('fs');
2 function callback(err, data) {
3     if (err) throw new Error();
4 }
5 function main() {
6     fs.readFile('file1.txt', callback);
7     fs.readFile('file2.txt', callback);
8 }
9 main();
```

```
> if (err) throw new Error();
>           ^
> Error
>     at <dir>\example.js:3:17
>     at fs.js:207:20
>     at Object.oncomplete (fs.js:107:15)
```